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Abstract. This article examines recent regulation in the sport of chess with a focus on 
cheating. On the one hand, disciplinary law in chess could be considered relatively 
underdeveloped compared with other sports. On the other hand, however, this kind 
of ‘underdevelopment’ might be appropriate since chess governing bodies have not yet 
introduced interventionist rules. These two interacting perspectives shape the aim and 
the objectives of legal research designed to protect the chess community from cheating 
by suggesting adequate disciplinary measures. The analysis focuses mainly on two 
forms of cheating: computer-assisted cheating and match-fixing. The broad concept 
of cheating and relatively young legal regulation in an under-researched sport call for 
interdisciplinary analysis, therefore, knowledge of sports law, human rights as well as 
criminology is applied.
Keywords: cheating, match-fixing, chess, computer-assisted cheating.
Contents lists available at Vilnius University Press
Received: 26/11/2020. Accepted: 23/12/2020
Copyright © 2020 Salomėja Zaksaitė. Published by Vilnius University Press
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Licence, which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
*  The research is funded by the national long-term programme: a new approach to 
corruption: challenges and opportunities outside the boundaries of the public sector. 
The programme is carried out by the Law Institute of Lithuania.
ISSN 2351-6097   eISSN 2538-8754   KRIMINOLOGIJOS STUDIJOS 2020/8
58
Sukčiavimas šachmatuose: integruoto  
teisinio reguliavimo poreikis
Santrauka. Moksliniame straipsnyje šachmatų sporto pagrindu analizuojamos dvi ne-
sąžiningo elgesio formos: kompiuterinis sukčiavimas ir manipuliacijos sporto varžy-
bomis. Kompiuterinio sukčiavimo įrodinėjimo procesas vyksta pasitelkiant statistinę 
amerikiečių profesoriaus K. Regano programą, kuria remiantis nustatomi nuokrypiai 
nuo vadinamojo žmogiškojo žaidimo. Tokio įrodinėjimo keblumas yra tas, kad šiuo 
metu pasaulyje yra labai nedaug ekspertų, gebančių taikyti šią programą. Todėl tyrimo 
pabaigoje formuojamos rekomendacijos išplėsti šią programą iki globalaus masto, ap-
mokyti minėto profesoriaus asistentus ir įdiegti reikalingą techninę infrastruktūrą tam, 
kad šią programą gebėtų taikyti daugiau žmonių. Manipuliacijos sporto varžybomis 
šachmatų sporte kol kas buvo įrodytos tik vieną kartą – precedentinėje Kenijos byloje. 
To priežastys yra santykinai lakoniška aptariamosios srities teisinė bazė, ribotos draus-
minių institucijų tyrimo galimybės, pranešėjų apsaugos nebuvimas. Atsižvelgiant į šias 
spragas tyrime siūloma įvesti inovatyvią taisyklę, de facto leisiančią bausti už prielai-
das manipuliacijoms: turnyrų organizatoriai turėtų patys įrodyti, kad varžybos nebuvo 
sutartos (t.  y. nebuvo manipuliuojamos), kitu atveju turnyras nebūtų reitinguojamas 
Tarptautinės šachmatų federacijos (FIDE) ir nebūtų suteikiami tarptautiniai titulai juos 
įvykdžiusiems sportininkams. Svarbu pažymėti, jog panašią taisyklę jau yra įvedusi 
Lietuvos futbolo federacija, ir Tarptautinis sporto arbitražo teismas tokią inovatyvią 
teisėkūros praktiką toleravo. Taigi tyrimas parodė, kad šachmatų sportas susiduria su 
rimtomis grėsmėmis. Tam, kad būtų deramai kovojama su galimomis korupcijos ir 
sukčiavimo apraiškomis, būtinas ne vien teisinės bazės tobulinimas, bet ir ekspertinis 
švietimas bei suvokimas, jog šio sporto specifika reikalauja tiek teisinių, tiek statistinių, 
tiek techninių sprendimų.
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: sukčiavimas, manipuliacijos sporto varžybomis, šachmatai, ko-
mpiuterinis sukčiavimas.
Introduction
It is quite clear that cheating in chess is dangerous per se  as it robs the 
sport of its essential features of uncertainty of outcome and sporting integrity, 
and accelerates its spin into the forum of entertainment, thus becoming no 
longer a sport (McLaren, 2008). The notion of cheating is opposed to fairness – 
often defined as respect for the rules, and not only the letter of the rules, 
but also their spirit (Butcher, Schneider, 1998). According to Gardiner et al. 
(2005), rising legalism in sport is connected with the desire to achieve higher 
sporting standards. The primary question is the degree to which the state, or 
the Federation, should interfere in such a specific field as cheating in chess. 
Salomėja Zaksaitė. Cheating in chess: a call for an integrated disciplinary regulation
59
This question is not purely philosophical, and two views are usually presented: 
paternalistic and libertarian. The right to regulate some harmful activities of 
human behaviour is explained as paternalism, where essentially the state (in 
the context of cheating in chess, the International Chess Federation (FIDE)) 
acts as a parent, guiding behaviour. The roots of this perception can be found 
in J. S. Mill’s doctrine – the philosopher thought that human behaviour could 
be justifiably regulated or prohibited if it is dangerous to others.1
Opponents of paternalism argue that the state should not be too 
interventional. This is a libertarian view: people may behave as they want if 
they manage to deal with others. In this article, the shift from libertarianism 
to paternalism is discussed: the regulation of cheating in chess is too recent 
to be called paternalistic, but the tendency of legal regulation is towards an 
interventionist model of law-making. The main aim of this article is to analyse 
the regulation of cheating in chess and identify its drawbacks. The objectives 
that help to achieve this aim are: 1) to identify the main characteristics 
of cheating in chess; 2) to identify the main problems of proving cheating; 
3) to suggest certain disciplinary measures that would not be excessively 
interventionist, but would still help the chess community to fight cheating. 
The main method applied in the article is documentary analysis, although 
at times – due to the relatively long sporting experience of the author of the 
article – the text might resemble an intersubjective ethnographic study.
1 The direct quote is as follows: ‘The only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. 
He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him 
to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so 
would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or 
reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, 
or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. (…) The only part of the conduct 
of anyone, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part 
which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.’ See: Mill  J.  S. On Liberty. 
Ebook, Chapter  I. Introductory. 2011. Accessed 3  May 2020. https://www.gutenberg.
org/files/34901/34901-h/34901-h.htm#Page_140.
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1. The concept of cheating in chess
Depending on the theoretical paradigm, objectives, and context, various 
authors outline different attributes of cheating in sports. Comparative analysis 
of cheating in sports accentuates essential features by defining it as a deceptive 
violation of sport rules. Deception suggests wilful intention. It is also worth 
mentioning that these features are relative: for example, the criminological 
perspective might likewise accentuate violation of the principles of respect, 
tolerance, and equality, thus bringing cheating closer to foul play, whereas 
legal positivism tends to distinguish these phenomena. The importance of 
these interacting perspectives is not limited to comparative purposes: some 
subtle concepts within the sports world cannot be defined using rigorous 
legal mechanisms; in the context of this article, the notion of fixed draws is 
relevant. The interplay of approaches is even more relevant when defining the 
opposite behaviour of cheating – that is ‘fair play’. There is no clear definition 
within the realm of legal positivism as to what constitutes fair play in chess. 
However, (ethnographic) observation of the chess world could offer some 
vivid concepts, for example, that fair play can be understood as an attempt to 
restore the correct flow of the game independently of what the formal result 
should be, which might imply Don Quixotic behaviour such as offering draws 
in winning positions. Interestingly, these idealistic acts take place not just in 
fiction, but at the highest level, although, admittedly, very rarely. The rationale 
behind this hyper-ethical behaviour is amazingly simple: a player would not 
feel particularly happy about an undeserved victory.2 Accordingly, honest 
2 One of the most widely known proponents of this behaviour is Czech GM David 
Navara. He said that “in that famous game Moiseenko – Navara from World Cup 2011, 
when playing my move, I touched two pieces – the bishop clearly intentionally, the king 
clearly unintentionally, when catching the bishop. I do not even know which I touched first, 
but it might have been the king. I played with the bishop. If I had to play with the king, I 
would have had to resign. I achieved a winning position but not knowing the exact rules, I 
had no idea what the correct decision was. (The arbiter seemed not to have seen the critical 
moment and his statement that he believed that I first touched the bishop was therefore 
completely irrelevant.) I wanted the match to be decided in a normal, unproblematic game 
(i.e., that is why Navara offered a draw in winning position  – S.  Z.). This eventually 
happened and I managed to win the rapid tie-break.” Author’s interview with David 
Navara. Interview date: 1 Feb. 2019.
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players might define cheating in a straightforward and plain fashion, stating, 
for instance, that cheating is an act by which an undeserved result is attained in 
the game (independently of whether the result is a win, draw or loss3).
Naturally, a legal approach calls for more concrete definitions. The 
prohibition on cheating in chess is found within the FIDE Code of Ethics 
(CoE). Art. 2.2.5 of the CoE prohibits cheating or attempts at cheating during 
games and tournaments. Art.  3.2 of the CoE stipulates that breaches of the 
FIDE Code of Ethics are punishable by one or more of the following sanctions: 
warning; reprimand; return of awards; fine of up to 25,000.00  US  dollars; 
revocations of titles and sports results; social work; maximum ban of 15 years 
on taking part in a chess competition, or in any chess-related activity, as a 
player, arbiter, organiser, or representative of a chess federation; temporary 
exclusion from membership or office.4
More specifically, anti-cheating issues are regulated by the 2018 Anti-
Cheating Regulations (Regulations). This document is a product of the FIDE 
Anti-Cheating Commission, renamed in 2019 as FIDE Fair Play Commission 
(FPL). Art. 2 of these Regulations states that ‘cheating’ means:
(i) the deliberate use of electronic devices or other sources of information 
or advice during a game; or
(ii) the manipulation of chess competitions including, but not limited to, 
result manipulation, sandbagging, match fixing, rating fraud, false 
identity, and deliberate participation in fictitious tournaments or 
games.
As may be implied from the Regulations, cheating also covers corruption-
related offences.5 Although this  choice is understandable, it is not very precise 
since it is more usual in the general sports world to distinguish between 
cheating-related offences (e.g., doping) and corruption-related offences (e.g., 
3 In chess, a win is recorded as one point, a loss as zero, and a draw earns a player 
0.5 points.
4 In reality, computer-assisted cheating or false accusations related to it is for now 
punished by suspension and revocation of titles; other sanctions are not applied.
5 In other words, the CoE and Regulations differentiate between (i) obtaining illicit 
assistance during a game of chess, and (ii) manipulation of competitions and results. 
The first is cheating in the narrow sense, whereas the second is corruption. Both are 
treated as ‘cheating’ in a wider sense.
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match-fixing).6 In this article, these two aspects are analysed separately for 
the following reasons: the deliberate use of electronic devices is indeed much 
closer to anti-doping rule violations7 and it is therefore logical to analyse it in 
the context of the World Anti-Doping Code and related CAS practice, whereas 
match-fixing in chess is more appropriately analysed through the lens of the 
Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions 
(Macolin Convention).
2. Peculiarities of match-fixing in chess
Art.  3.4 of the Macolin Convention defines manipulation of sports 
competitions as an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an 
improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order 
to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports 
competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for 
others.
The problems arising from this definition are quite explicit: the definition 
of ‘manipulation of sports competitions’ is very broad; manipulation covers 
both disciplinary and criminal offences, and the consequences of match-fixing 
could be very different, ranging from a ban on taking part in a specific activity to 
imprisonment.8 In addition, it is not necessary for the attempt to be successful in 
6 The FIDE Code of Ethics is more precise: cheating and match-fixing are entrenched in 
different articles: 2.2.5 and 2.1. However, for the sake of objectivity, it must be noted that 
Art. 2.1 is so laconic that the aforementioned precision is rather symbolic.
7 Conceptually, computer-assisted cheating is very similar to technology doping. Technol-
ogy doping is the practice of gaining a competitive advantage using sports equipment. 
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) considers prohibiting technologies if they are 
‘performance-enhancing’ or ‘being against the spirit of the sport’. In 2006, WADA initi-
ated a consultation on technology doping which is now officially recognised as a threat, 
whilst the decision to allow or ban a new technology, specifically relating to sports 
equipment, is the responsibility of each sport’s own governing body. https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/Technology_doping#cite_note-sportseng-1. Accessed 12 Jan. 2020.
8 A case in point is France with probably the most draconian legislation in Europe: in 
this country, since 2019, corruption in sport is punished with a fine up to 500 000 euros 
and imprisonment. See: Article  445-1-1 of the French Criminal Code: https://www.
legislationline.org/download/id/8546/file/France_CC_am012020_fr.pdf. Accessed 
3 May 2020.
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order to be prosecutable. The term ‘in order to’ indicates an intention to obtain 
an undue advantage for oneself or others, even if this intentional arrangement, 
act or omission, aiming at improperly modifying the results or course of a 
sports competition, fails to obtain the advantage sought (Explanatory report 
of the Macolin Convention, Art. 51, also CAS 2011/A/2490, § 3). In this way, 
an offence is described as a ‘conduct crime’ in that it doesn’t require the results 
to be concretised: a clear guideline in this regard is already provided for by 
legislation in some states, for instance, in Italy and Spain.9
When narrowing the concept of the manipulation of sports competitions 
as it relates to chess, it should be noted that chess both resembles and differs 
from other sports. When the players agree on winning or losing a game, then 
chess, in principle, is no different from any other sport; accordingly, such 
detrimental behaviour clearly falls under the concept of cheating as per Art. 2 
of the Regulations. However, one of the most controversial forms of (potential) 
match-fixing in chess are pre-determined draws where players agree before 
the actual game not to fight beyond an equal position, or even rehearse a 
‘peaceful’ game in advance. Such tactics are not uncommon. Many radical 
measures have been suggested to combat the draw problem in chess, but none 
have found favour with the overarching chess community, traditionalists and 
liberals alike (Smerdon, 2012). The general opinion among chess players is 
that fixed draws should be tolerated, as it is extremely hard physically and 
emotionally to play all the games to the fullest. A resounding position has been 
recently expressed by the FIDE Ethics & Disciplinary Commission in Case 
no.  2/2020 where it was stated that ‘the Ethics & Disciplinary Commission 
Chamber does not however find arranged draws as unacceptable match fixing 
per se, primarily due to the fact that chess players are allowed under the Rules 
of Chess (Art. 9.1.2.1)10 to propose and agree to a draw, admittedly only during 
the course of the game’ (§ 10.4).11
9 Di Giandomenico A. The Convention on Manipulation of Sports Competition: A First 
Comment. Presentation of 20th IASL Congress Sessions, Athens. http://iasl.org/pages/
en/sports_law_congresses/20th_int_congress/presentations.php. Accessed 12 Jan. 2020.
10 FIDE Laws of Chess. https://handbook.fide.com/chapter/E012018. Accessed 26 June 2020.
11 Case no. 2/2020: Alleged match-fixing during Kenyan National Women Chess Champi-
onship, 2019. https://ethics.fide.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FIDE-2_2020-deci-
sion-final.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2020.
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As Moul and Nye (2009) put it, if we consider that tournament chess is not 
simply stressful but notoriously tiring, we may hypothesise that very strong 
players who wish to collude can improve their performance against other 
players by agreeing to early or prearranged draws. Assuming for simplicity 
that the expected outcome of a game between players of equal strength is half 
a point each, a peaceful pair of agreed draws produces the same outcome with 
less effort and risk than taking a win and loss apiece.
To a certain extent, such insights lead to questioning whether chess is a 
sport (or in such cases, just a game) because chess players can legally agree 
to a draw at very early stages. Thus, the concept of manipulation may depend 
on the specificity of the sport: in some branches of sport similar acts may 
be considered as punishable and illegal manipulation, while in other sport 
branches they are just widespread tactics. It should also be taken into account 
that there are many other cases where ‘fixing’ is not so clear, even though 
the general public knows (or even expects) that it will happen. For instance, 
tournaments where one team is already advancing to the next round but 
still has a game to play and does not use its best players because the team 
can afford to lose a game. A case in point where a much stricter approach 
was demonstrated could be the sport of badminton in the London Olympics 
where four pairs of women’s doubles players, including the Chinese top seeds, 
were ejected from the Olympic tournament for trying to throw matches in an 
effort to secure a more favourable quarter-final draw. The Badminton World 
Federation read a brief statement saying the players had been disqualified 
for breaching two parts of the players’ code: ‘Not using one’s best efforts to 
win a match and conducting oneself in a manner that is clearly abusive or 
detrimental to the sport’ (Zaksaitė, 2013). Admittedly, the situation in chess is 
not identical: the rationale behind fixed draws is usually not to secure a more 
favourable opponent. However, the badminton experience might be useful 
for introducing the same criteria in chess: fixed draws might be considered 
detrimental to the sport when a clear abuse of the game is witnessed. In other 
words, although fixed draws in chess  are usually nowadays considered as 
tactics, this does not mean that in the nearest future the most dangerous forms 
of fixed draws will not be considered an abuse of the game. The FIDE Ethics 
& Disciplinary Commission has recently expressed a very similar position in 
aforementioned Case no. 2/2020: there are situations where arranged draws 
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may be in violation of the concept of sportsmanship and fair competition to 
such an extent that they would qualify as match fixing. One example is where 
one of the players is offered some kind of remuneration to agree to a draw 
(§ 10.5).12
However, this analysis does not exhaust the phenomenon of fixed draws 
in chess. Such acts might per se range from less dangerous to more critical. 
Accordingly, some acts can be considered sports tactics, some can be regarded 
as a foul play whereas others already qualify as match-fixing. Examples are as 
follows:
1) Simply caring about your own long-term performance and agreeing to 
a draw in order to save energy for the next round.
2) The situation where a coach, for the benefit of his student, decides to 
save the student’s energy for the later games and agrees to a draw.
3) Cartel-like agreements where a group of masters are more likely to 
draw when they play each other than when they are playing with other 
masters.
4) Not showing one’s best efforts while playing in round-robin (or ‘all-play-
all’) tournaments in order to create more possibilities for promising 
players to fulfil international norms.
All four examples are ambiguous but they differ in scale and consequences. 
Cartel-like agreements (i.e., the third example) were more prevalent in the 
cold-war period and still exist today, albeit to a lesser extent. Such agreements 
may be politically oriented or done for purely commercial interests. For the 
sake of comparison, similar agreements exist in other sports, for example, in 
Formula-1 where the so-called ‘sister team’ policy exists. Although there are 
no scientific or sports-law related definitions of sister teams, it can be stated 
that they are teams not formally connected but which help each other in 
competition, this cooperation being doubtful in terms of fair competition. The 
F1 Red Bull and Toro Rosso teams could practically be considered sister teams 
in that, both being controlled by the same executives, they help each other in 
races in the most needful situations (Zaksaitė, Raduševičius, 2017).
12 Case no. 2/2020: Alleged match-fixing during the Kenyan National Women Chess Cham-
pionship, 2019. https://ethics.fide.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FIDE-2_2020-de-
cision-final.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2020.
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The fourth example comes close to match-fixing, since this behaviour is 
usually driven purely by selfish motives: an overly principled grandmaster 
(who shows his best efforts and fighting spirit in every game) is less likely to 
be invited to some dubious round-robin tournaments. Thus, there does exist 
an implicit arrangement between the organiser and the grandmaster that the 
latter will create certain conditions to ‘help’ young talents meet international 
norms. Interestingly, even this type of behaviour is not unambiguously 
condemned by the chess community.13 Certain euphemistic techniques 
are invented: playing below one’s efforts is called upbringing, assistance, or 
sacrifice. In this respect, the margin between unfair play and match-fixing 
is thin since a person might unconsciously drift from seemingly innocent 
behaviour towards cheating. Football is a relevant example in this regard. The 
convincing language of match-fixing in this sport requires a certain technique 
as well. For example, a football official from Malaysia describes a case where 
corrupt persons used neutral language to prevent athletes realising they were 
behaving illegally. Bribes were called ‘tips’, bookmakers were called ‘agents’, 
non-initiated investigations were referred to as ‘swapping dust under the 
carpet’, coercion was called ‘trust’ (Hill, 2009). Such euphemisms illustrate 
the insights of criminologist David Matza (1964), according to whom 
certain practices (so-called techniques of neutralisation) may help neutralise 
remorse. According to Matza (1964), the process can be described as a ‘drift’ 
from honest behaviour to cheating, and deviant behaviour can be understood 
as a stream. Specific (learned or self-made) practices, language and patterns 
of behaviour help to get into the stream – a subculture of deviant behaviour. 
From a cultural point of view, it should be noted that entire nations or even 
continents could be seen as a ‘stream’. For example, it is argued that the 
simulation of injury in football is considered an act of high professionalism in 
Latin America, but is called dishonourable in Europe; according to Lithuanian 
13 Though, of course, some simple preventative measures have already been invented: for 
example, Grandmaster Nunn suggests that tournament organisers should collude to 
extend invitations to only those top players exhibiting ‘fighting spirit’. Smerdon D. Fixing 
Flaws and Stopping Draws. A new chess tie-break system based on directed network 
analysis. Social Network Analysis Research Proposal, Tinbergen Institute, 2012. https://
www.academia.edu/24439310/Fixing_Flaws_and_Stopping_Draws_A_new_chess_tie-
break_system_based_on_directed_network_analysis. Accessed 3 May 2020.
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basketball player Arvydas Sabonis, it was not uncommon for athletes from 
former Yugoslavia to simulate injuries in basketball.14 Similarly, in chess, a 
cultural drift might be explained geopolitically: cartel-like agreements were 
more prevalent among players and coaches from the former Soviet Union 
countries (Moul, Nye, 2009).
That being said, we can conclude the discussion of fixed draws in chess 
by underlining the following insights. Firstly, it must be noted that legal 
positivism may be insufficient for describing this phenomenon. It is not easy 
to determine when actions that appear to be part of the legitimate tactics of 
the sport become deviant and thus punishable. Criminology might be a more 
proper ‘ally’ when trying to analyse the manifestations of fixed draws in chess. 
Secondly, fixed draws are manifested in different forms: some types of fixed 
draws are closer to the tactical dimension of the sport while others come 
very close to match-fixing. Several criteria should be taken into account to 
delimitate these forms,: the importance of the tournament, the round of the 
tournament (fixed draws in the last round tend to be more harmful compared 
to those occurring at the beginning of the competition), the consequences of 
prearranged draws, the degree to which the game is abused, the commercial 
interest vested in the particular competition, etc.15 In my opinion, fixing draws 
to save energy for the next game should not be considered match-fixing. In 
the light of the introduction to this article, one might state that this a kind of 
fixed draw mainly concerns one person and does not cause substantial harm 
to others, thus the Federation’s intervention is not necessary. Similarly, no 
euphemistic techniques are needed – players can simply state that fixing draws 
is a lesser evil than playing two rounds (i.e., approximately 8 hours) per day. 
14 Donskis  L. (host). Be pykčio [Without Anger]. Vilnius: LTV2, 2011. Accessed 
3  May  2020. https://www.lrt.lt/mediateka/irasas/31600/be-pykcio-pokalbis-ne-apie-
laimeta-auksa-o-apie-pati-arvyda-saboni-sporte-ir-gyvenime.
15 In this respect, Smerdon noted that in an age when grandmasters are concerned about 
protecting their livelihood, but the general public craves increasing levels of excitement 
and drama for their entertainment purposes, professional chess is at risk of becoming 
obsolete. Smerdon D. Fixing Flaws and Stopping Draws. A new chess tie-break system 
based on directed network analysis. Social Network Analysis Research Proposal, 
Tinbergen Institute, 2012. https://www.academia.edu/24439310/Fixing_Flaws_and_
Stopping_Draws_A_new_chess_tie-break_system_based_on_directed_network_
analysis. Accessed 3 May 2020.
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However, cartel-like agreements seem to be very close to match-fixing, whilst 
the example of the player and the ‘selfless’ coach seem to lie at the borderline 
and requires individual handling. The fourth example (not showing one’s best 
efforts while playing in round-robin (or ‘all-play-all’) tournaments) also lies 
on the borderline: it depends on the degree to which the grandmaster is ready 
to sacrifice his own rating for the benefit of the (usually) younger generation.
3. The investigation process of cheating in chess
Taking into consideration the two-fold concept of cheating in chess, this 
chapter is divided into two parts: the process of investigating  computer-
assisted cheating and the process of investigating  match-fixing.
3.1. The process of investigating computer-assisted cheating
Computer-assisted cheating is widely deemed to be the greatest threat to 
the future of chess and many amateurs and even professionals regularly allege 
that cheating is rampant. The 2006 world championship match was roiled by 
accusations by Veselin Topalov against Vladimir Kramnik. Another high-level 
accusation by elite grandmaster Shakhriyar Mamedyarov against grandmaster 
Igor Kurnosov at the 2009 Aeroflot Open is regarded as groundless. However, 
there are many recent cases that carry more weight. These include the revocation 
of the gold medal won by Sebastian Feller at the 2010 Chess Olympiad and the 
disqualifications of Christoph Nastidis from the 2011 German championships 
and Gaioz Nigalidze from the 2015 Dubai Open. Every year for the past decade 
there have been multiple cases resulting in sanctions, others in exonerations, 
and others not resolved. The problem is made harder by the fact that a cheater 
does not have to use assistance for an entire game. Using a computer at one 
or several critical points in a game can dramatically affect the outcome. In the 
cases of Nastidis and Nigalidze, a cell phone was used in the restroom at key 
moments in the games (Copeland, 2019). This has aspects of so-called ‘wicked 
problems’, but is amenable to quantitative methods that can guide problem-
solving in other sports and areas of educational testing.
Computer-assisted cheating has already been investigated by the FIDE 
Ethics Commission (ETH) in quite a number of cases: 2/2011, 6/2014, 8/2015, 
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7/2015, 2/2016, 1/2018, 6/2019 and 8/2019.16 Firstly, it should be noted that 
chess disciplinary law embraces case-law of the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
(CAS) related to standards of proof. According to established CAS practice, 
the standard of proof in cases involving disciplinary and ethical violations 
in sport is the standard of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ (‘sufficient confidence’ 
of the hearing experts), which is higher than the standard of ‘balance of 
probability’, commonly used in civil proceedings in most countries. The CAS 
panel of arbitrators reached this conclusion, for example, in CAS 2011/A/2625 
Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA,17 citing established CAS case-law and, in 
particular, CAS  2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA.18 The same conclusion 
was reached in case no. CAS  2014/A/3628 Eskişehirspor Kulübü v. UEFA, 
where the panel of arbitrators also stated that the seriousness of the violation 
must be taken into account when using this standard, i.e., the more serious the 
violation and its consequences, the higher the level of ‘sufficient confidence’ 
should be for the arbitrators to allow a decision on the application of sanctions 
against the accused person.19
Computer programmes are already used by FIDE to provide evidence of 
players using dishonest methods of play through statistical data analysis, and 
provide important additional information for investigating cheating during 
chess matches. The decisions of the ETH in cases 8/2015 and 2/2016 describe 
in detail the method of functioning and the feasibility of using Dr. Regan’s20 
system as the most complete system unifying data from different chess 
programmes for the detection of unfair play in order to provide important 
evidence that a player committed a cheating-related violation.21
16 FIDE Ethics Commission, list of decisions: http://ethics.fide.com/list-of-decisions/. 
Accessed 12 Jan. 2020.
17 CAS 2011/A/2625 Mohamed Bin Hammam v. FIFA, pp. 37-38, § 153.
18 CAS 2011/A/2426 Amos Adamu v. FIFA, pp. 44, § 88.
19 CAS 2014/A/3628 Eskişehirspor Kulübü v. UEFA, pp. 33-34, § 123-124.
20 Dr Kenneth Regan is an Associate Professor with tenure in Computer Science at the 
State University of New York at Buffalo (USA).
21 Combined motivation for the decisions of the FIDE Ethics Commission in cases 
nos.  8/2015 (Alleged cheating by Mr  Ivan Tetimov (BUL)  - Benidorm 2014) and 
2/2016 (Alleged cheating by Mr Arcangelo Ricciardi (ITA) - Imperia Open, 2015) dated 
1 March 2018. https://ethics.fide.com/images/stories/FIDE_ETHICS_COMMISSION_-_
MOTIVATION_-_TETIMOV__RICCIARDI_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020.
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Art.  12.21, 12.25 and 12.36.4 of the combined motivation for deci-
sions 8/2015 and 2/2016 state that in order to provide a statistical judgment, 
Dr. Regan’s model uses three separate statistical tests, each producing a z-score 
to indicate variance with the projected performance: (1) The Move-Matching 
percentage (MM); (2) Equal-top value moves (EV); and (3) Scaled Difference, 
i.e., total error (SD) and Average Scaled Difference (ASD) when averaged over 
all the positions analysed. The outcomes of MM, EV and SD tests are convert-
ed into z-scores indicating the probability of fair play / cheating by comparing 
the player’s actual performance with the projected (expected) performance 
of a player of the same strength. If the deviation is sufficiently significant, it 
provides statistical proof of the probability of cheating. Thus Dr. Regan runs 
his statistical programme to generate projections, measure deviations and 
complete confidence intervals, for several aggregate statistics. The parameter 
settings are derived from the post-tournament ELO rating;22 the main tests 
are MM, EV and SD. The programme computes projections and z-scores ac-
cording to the well-known statistical theory of independent Bernoulli trials 
and Gaussian normal distribution.
CHART 1. The statistical probability of cheating  









22 The ELO rating system is a method for calculating the relative skill levels of chess players. 
It is named after its creator Arpad Elo, a Hungarian-American physics professor. FIDE 
officially applies this system; thus, ELO rating and FIDE rating are used as synonyms.
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The higher the z-score, the higher the level of ‘sufficient confidence’ of the 
referees; if the z-score is extremely high (4.5 or more), it clearly indicates the 
lowest possible probability (approximately 300,000 to 1) that the player acted 
honestly, and should be clearly sufficient to meet the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ 
standard of proof and to find the athlete guilty of cheating. In this case, the 
athlete should be allowed to present in turn arguments in his defence, based 
on facts and circumstances that must be proven at the level of ‘balance of 
probability’. It should be noted that these arguments should not be unfounded 
but need to conform to the above standard. One can be sure that if the z-score 
is higher than 4.5, then the presumption of proof of a violation at the level 
of ‘comfortable satisfaction’ is established, which the athlete should be able 
to refute at the same level of ‘balance of probability’.23 Again, this opinion of 
FIDE lawyers  echoes CAS case-law.24 For example, when analysing the Athlete 
Biological Passport25 (ABP) profile, CAS stated that, as to the absence of positive 
tests and the method applied to evaluate the samples provided by the Athlete 
to find an anti-doping rule violation, the Panel noted that the ABP profile had 
been validated in a long line of CAS cases (see inter alia: CAS 2010/A/2174; 
CAS 2010/A/2178; CAS 2010/A/2308 & 2335; CAS 2012/A/2773; as well as 
CAS 2010/A/2235) as being a reliable means to detect blood doping, even in 
the absence of positive tests, through the identification of abnormal values 
calling for an explanation by the athlete in question.26 It is important to note 
that, in the context of chess, a ‘positive test’ would be physical evidence e.g. 
a telephone  / computer found with a programme running during the game 
23 FIDE/SILA lawyers’ legal opinion on Dr Regan’s statistical model (2019).
24 The only difference is that in CAS case-law usually more than one expert is called for, 
whereas chess world for now has only one or two experts.
25 In order to improve the testing regime, WADA introduced the Athlete Biological Passport 
(ABP) so that abnormal variations in specific biological values can be monitored. The 
ABP can be used to identify athletes to target testing and may be used to pursue an anti-
doping rule violation while the specific illicit substance no longer has to be detected 
itself. ABP was introduced to improve the detection of cheating and catching those who 
manage to avoid detection by direct testing for illegal substances. Westmattelmann D. 
et al. Perception of the Current Anti-doping Regime – A Quantitative Study Among 
German Top-Level Cyclists and Track and Field Athletes  //  Front Psychology, 2018, 
vol. 9, pp. 1-14.
26 CAS 2015/A/4010 IAAF v. ARAF, Vladimir Kanaikin & RUSADA, award of 25 April 2016 
(operative award of 24 March 2016), § 121.
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in question. Thus, by analogy with ABP, Dr.  Regan’s system is devoted to 
detecting cheating in the absence of any ‘positive test’ as such or when other 
evidence alone would be inconclusive. It is worth noting that players caught 
red-handed usually plead guilty to cheating; therefore a ‘positive test’ per se 
leads to an easier and simpler process of establishing proof.
The following is a summary of the computer-assisted cheating investigation 
issues: Dr. Regan’s system is of invaluable help to the chess world in proving 
computer-assisted cheating cases. It can be conceptually compared to ABP 
evidence or the Betting Fraud Detection System (BFDS).27 However, as it is 
carried out mainly by one person it is fragile in itself, and it would therefore 
be very much advisable that at least three institutions (similarly to the case 
of anti-doping laboratories) could use the system. Technically, this can be 
done by creating some form of online-screening tool28 to analyse all available 
27 WADA’s ABP and BFDS, similarly to Dr.  Regan’s system, rely on a large amount of 
general information used to identify usual and unusual situations in order to determine 
the possible commission of an offence. Still, a deeper look might reveal conceptual 
differences as well as similarities between these systems. See more: Ibarrola  J. (2017) 
CAS  2015/A/4351, VsI Pakruojo FK, Darius Jankauskas, Armas Mikaitis, Sigitas 
Olberkis, Valdas Pocevicius, Alfredas Skroblas, Donatas Strockis, Diogo Gouveia 
Miranda, C. H. Alexandru, Taras Michailiuk v. Lithuanian Football Federation, award of 
13 July 2016. In: Duval A., Rigozzi A. (eds) Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration 
2016. Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague.
28 Currently, games have to be sent to Dr. Regan in PGN (portable game notation) format 
and he screens them. Technically, the proposal is to set up an online screening tool that 
allows the user to upload a PGN file, screen the game and send the results back whilst 
alerting Dr. Regan and the FIDE Fair Play Commission of any detected irregularities. 
In order to achieve this, a front-end application will have to be developed that will in-
terface with the back-end calculation system. Given the computing requirements, it is 
desirable that the back-end calculation is done using distributed computing (cloud). The 
front end is required to upload and screen the PGN file to ensure there are no errors in 
the file, send this file to the back-end calculation system, maintain a queue of files and 
disseminate results. A simplified workflow is as follows. A PGN file is uploaded to the 
application along with a contact email address, the app performs an integrity check on 
the file reporting any errors and the file is placed in a queue for processing. When the 
file reaches the front of the queue, it is sent to the calculation system, calculation system 
performs the analysis and sends the result back to the app. The app compiles a report 
and transmits it to the sender and all other authorised parties. In the case of anomalies, 
the report may contain recommendations for further action. The complexity in the sys-
tem is in the back-end calculation. This has already been developed by Dr. Regan, but to 
make it accessible for use, it needs a front-end application to drive and control the data.
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chess games and instantly detect abnormalities caused by computer-assisted 
cheating. It should be emphasised that the prevention of cheating in chess 
is unique in that it requires comprehensive knowledge in the fields of chess, 
computing, and data science. The screening tool embodies modern goals of 
large-scale data representation to spot potential anomalies. The predictive-
analytic component deals with the forecasting of probabilities or natural 
frequencies for events or decisions. In terms of chess, the probabilities are put 
on chess moves selected by a person with respect to that person’s ELO rating 
and other parameters reflecting the person’s skills and style of play. Both are 
applied to human behaviour – with the aim of detecting non-human behaviour 
behind the chess board.29
That said, chess is breaking the ice by identifying (ir)regular patterns of 
human thought, and the experience borrowed from chess can be useful in 
other fields far beyond anti-cheating, for example insurance companies, 
stock trading, educational testing, and betting markets. In the latter example, 
Dr.  Regan himself already compared his model to that used in the betting 
market: ‘My chess model does the same thing to a chess position  – given 
information about the skill set of the player deciding on a move – that a bookie 
does to a horse race. It sets odds on each legal move to ‘win’ by being played in 
the game. The probabilities need to be accurate for the same reason bookmakers 
need their ‘initial betting lines’ to be close to how bets will ultimately balance, 
so they can preserve their margin. A horse with highest probability – perhaps 
a tie – is the bookie’s favorite’.30
3.2. The process of investigating  
match-fixing and related offences
Firstly, it should be noted that up to now there have been only two 
match-fixing cases decided within FIDE. In Case no. 8/2019, the respondent 
confessed that, besides other cheating incidents, he also fixed a match. § 8.2 of 




30 See more: Regan  K.  W. Predicting Chess and Horses. https://rjlipton.wordpress.
com/2019/08/15/predicting-chess-and-horses/. Accessed 3 May 2020.
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the Decision stated that ‘at the hearing the respondent confessed that he had 
made himself guilty of cheating in one game at the 2015 Czech Championships 
(Havlickuv Brod) and in one game at the 2017 Teplice Open by similar use of 
his mobile phone. In addition, the respondent confessed that he arranged with 
his opponent beforehand the outcome of a game at the 2017 Teplice Open in the 
respondent’s favour.’31 In Case no. 2/2020, the respondents were found guilty 
of an attempt at match-fixing. § 11.7 of the Decision stated that the offence 
must be deemed to be of a serious nature as match fixing is perilous for all 
sports, chess included. § 10.10 12.3 and 12.4 of the Decision asserted that even 
if it is not established that specific remuneration was offered or accepted, the 
Chamber is comfortably satisfied that the respondents did attempt to fix the 
result in their game to their mutual benefit. The Chamber inter alia considered 
the statement of the Arbiter Moses Maina to the FPL wherein he described the 
conversation in writing between the respondents showing how they planned 
to share the cash prize. The offence was committed at a FIDE rated event which 
was the first step in the qualification for the Kenyan Women Olympiad team. 
Both respondents were sanctioned by a worldwide ban of 24 months (the last 
six months of which were suspended and served as a probationary period) 
from participating as a player in any FIDE rated chess competition, taking 
effect from the date of the decision, 21 June 2020.32
In fact, with reference to match-fixing, Case no.  2/2020 is a landmark 
precedential case where the concepts of (attempted) match-fixing and fixed 
draws were studied in great detail. Match-fixing is (more precisely, was, until 
June 2020) rarely investigated within FIDE for the following reasons: (1) the 
Anti-cheating policy within FIDE itself is very recent, and priority was given 
to the fight against computer-assisted cheating; (2) up to 2018, there was 
hardly any legal framework within FIDE to tackle match-fixing. Presently, the 
legal framework is a little more coherent (match-fixing at least is covered by 
the concept of cheating), but still rather fragmented and very laconic; (3) there 
31 Case no. 8/2019: Allegations of cheating at the 2019 Strasbourg tournament and various 
other tournaments against GM Igor Rausis. https://www.fide.com/docs/decisions-
resolutions/Ethics%20case%208_2019%20Decision.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020.
32 Case no. 2/2020: Alleged match-fixing during the Kenyan National Women Chess Cham-
pionship, 2019. https://ethics.fide.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/FIDE-2_2020-de-
cision-final.pdf. Accessed 26 June 2020.
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are not only legal, but also practical obstacles related to the protection of 
reporting persons, and certain forms of suspicious behaviour (failure to report 
suspicious activity, presumed match-fixing) are also not prohibited in chess. 
These obstacles are studied in more detail below.
In practical terms, one of the most evident obstacles is that related to 
the protection of reporting persons. Article  7.2 of the Macolin Convention 
states that Each Party shall encourage sports organisations to adopt and 
implement the appropriate measures in order to ensure effective mechanisms 
to facilitate the disclosure of any information concerning potential or actual 
cases of manipulation of sports competitions, including adequate protection 
for whistle-blowers. In the criminological sense, such measures would help to 
break omertà (i.e., code of silence) and build trust in sporting organisations. 
However, the FIDE 2018 Anti-Cheating Regulations contain no clauses on 
the protection of whistle-blowers. In practice, a whistle-blower reports some 
suspicious event to an official from FIDE (for example, the Director General), 
then the FIDE official asks FPL to initiate an investigation. This is a flawed 
practice since FPL loses access to the primary source of information33 and 
as a result it is very hard to collect evidence. In this respect, Art. 47 and 48 
of the 2019 UEFA disciplinary regulations where the protection of witnesses 
is entrenched should be considered and adjusted for chess by stating, for 
example, that witnesses may remain anonymous when they or their family 
may be in physical danger, and also when there is a perceivable risk to 
their sporting career. Needless to say, ‘remaining anonymous’ should mean 
anonymity for the public, but not for the disciplinary bodies themselves (this 
paradoxical situation may now occur and occurs de facto in chess). In this 
respect, CAS jurisprudence in case CAS 2009/A/1920 is relevant. In this case, 
CAS considered the testimony of witnesses given anonymously and found 
that the use of anonymous witnesses’ statements was admissible yet at the 
same time subject to strict conditions. The right to be heard and to a fair trial 
must be ensured through other means, namely by cross examination through 
‘audiovisual protection’ and by an in-depth check of the identity and the 
reputation of the anonymous witness by the court (CAS 2009/A/1920 § 55, 
33 Of course, nobody stops the Investigative Chamber from contacting the initial com-
plainant, but the problem is that the Investigative Chamber might not know that person.
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72).34 A similar position has been presented by the European Court of Human 
Rights: an anonymous witness could be questioned in a room away from the 
hearing room, with an audio and video link enabling the accused to ask the 
witness questions.35 In other words, all necessary measures must be taken to 
avoid false accusation, called in the chess world ‘witch-hunting’.36
Match-fixing is also difficult to prove because (contrary to the Macolin 
Convention37) failure to report any suspicious activity, incident, incentive or 
approach is not yet an offence in chess. In other sports, failure to notify the 
competent authorities of a potential disclosure of confidential information 
relevant to the outcome or course of the competition would be considered 
dishonest behaviour. It is worth remembering CAS case no. 2010/A/2172 of 
the Ukrainian referee Oriekhov: the referee was punished not for specific 
actions, but for failure to act, i.e., for failure to report offers of match-fixing 
(§ 20). 
It should be further noted that presumed match-fixing is not prohibited 
by FIDE laws, although the CAS would probably tolerate such legislation. For 
34 CAS  2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v. UEFA 
https://arbitrationlaw.com/sites/default/files/free_pdfs/CAS%202009-A-1920%20
FKP%20et%20al%20v%20UEFA%20Award.pdf. Accessed 3 May 2020.
35 ECHR decision on Balta and Demir v. Turkey, Application no. 48628/12, judgment of 
23 June 2015, final on 23 September 2015.
36 False accusation in Art. I.5 of the Anti-Cheating Regulations is defined as an abuse of 
freedom of expression that is prohibited by the Code of Ethics. An accusation of cheat-
ing that is manifestly unfounded, i.e., based only on emotion and/or insufficient data, 
is a false accusation. It is important to note that it is possible to be punished for a false 
accusation, and this has already happened in ETH Case no. 3/2015, which has emerged 
as a case of ‘witch-hunting’, namely a case of targeting a chess player in a public smear 
campaign with accusations of cheating based upon fears and suspicions unsupported 
by any concrete evidence. Case no. 3/2015: Discrimination against a player by fellow 
participants in the European Individual Women’s Chess Championship, Chakvi, Geor-
gia, 2015. https://ethics.fide.com/images/stories/Motivation_Sandu_final_31.07.pdf. 
Accessed 3 May 2020.
37 Art. 7.1.c of the Convention stipulates that Each Party shall encourage sports organisa-
tions and competition organisers to adopt and implement rules to combat the manipu-
lation of sports competitions as well as principles of good governance, related, inter alia, 
to the requirement for competition stakeholders to report immediately any suspicious 
activity, incident, incentive or approach which could be considered an infringement of 
the rules against the manipulation of sports competitions.
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example, paragraph  4 of CAS  2015/A/4351 states that a player can be held 
responsible for presumed match manipulation (even) when the finding of 
actual match manipulation is not possible.38 In the case of chess, one cannot rely 
on irregular betting patterns as a presumption of fixing, but it is still possible to 
use some specific expertise – for instance, graphological analysis of the score 
sheets could indicate if the game was indeed played or if it was fixed.39 So, in 
principle, chess has certain peculiarities as regards proving match-fixing, but 
conceptually they are not very different in essence from those of other sports. 
The problem is that disciplinary regulation in chess is not tailored to proving 
match-fixing: if a fixer does not confess, there are hardly any means to collect 
the relevant evidence.
That said, it is almost impossible for the time being to prove match-fixing 
without police assistance. Another possibility is to grant FPL powers similar 
to those of prosecutors and officers from (inter alia) the tennis integrity unit – 
38 Sports institutions, such as the Lithuanian Football Federation (LFF), in this case, 
demonstrated originality in the drafting of rules providing for ‘light’ means of evidence. It 
should be emphasised that the rules in question were redrafted several times. According 
to the recent knowledge of the author of this article (who, as an attorney-at-law, tried 
to defend one football player in the Disciplinary case no. 2019/26) in practical terms, in 
order to sanction clubs and players for breaching the prohibition on ‘presumed match-
fixing’, LFF needs to establish the following conditions: (1) that a particular match may 
have been fixed; (2) that the conduct of a particular player in that match is atypical 
and gives grounds to believe that there may have been a breach of the prohibition 
on match-fixing. The first condition is usually substantiated by UEFA reports, which 
are compiled by analysing match-specific betting market data. Analysis of such data 
gives a sufficient impression as to whether a match might have been fixed. The second 
condition is proven by video analysis of specific suspicious matches. The LFF has set up 
a special match Investigative Committee for this purpose. It is its responsibility to carry 
out such analysis. This Committee analyses matches and player behaviour and draws 
conclusions to that effect. Thus, the conclusion of the Committee is the decisive factor 
for the fulfilment of the second condition. See Ibarrola J. (2017) CAS 2015/A/4351, VsI 
Pakruojo FK, Darius Jankauskas, Armas Mikaitis, Sigitas Olberkis, Valdas Pocevicius, 
Alfredas Skroblas, Donatas Strockis, Diogo Gouveia Miranda, C. H. Alexandru, Taras 
Michailiuk v. Lithuanian Football Federation, award of 13  July  2016. In: Duval  A., 
Rigozzi  A. (eds) Yearbook of International Sports Arbitration 2016. Yearbook of 
International Sports Arbitration. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague.
39 A beautiful, overly neat handwriting might indicate that the game was fixed. And vice 
versa – a nervous, shaky handwriting during a difficult period might indicate that the 
game in question was played honestly.
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that is, inter alia, the obligation for the defendants and other related people 
to furnish (accordingly – the power of the integrity unit to ask for) any object 
or information regarding the alleged Corruption Offense, including, without 
limitation, (i) personal devices (including mobile telephone(s), tablets and / or 
laptop computers), (ii) access to any social media accounts and cloud storage 
held by the Covered Person (including provision of user names and passwords), 
(iii) hard copy or electronic records relating to the alleged Corruption Offense 
(...).40 However, not only do Members of FPL have no similar powers, but most 
of them work for FIDE on a voluntary basis.
Considering the fragility of the powers granted to FPL, I would like to 
suggest one simple rule. A solution would be to state that FIDE has the right 
to reject norms or not to rate certain tournaments unless the organisers can 
prove on the balance of probabilities that the tournament was not fixed. Of 
course, prior to refusing to rate a tournament, there should be at least some 
proof / preliminary data on potential match-fixing. In the chess world, the most 
likely proof in such cases would be the testimonies of (anonymous) witnesses. 
In fact, this suggestion would allow punishment for presumed match-fixing, 
and importantly, it would also allow punishment for the most dangerous forms 
of fixed-draws. The proposal would be in line with disciplinary regulations 
found in other sports. For example, the World Anti-Doping Code establishes 
that the burden of proof for an anti-doping rule violation generally rests 
with the anti-doping organisation, but in cases where the burden of proof 
is transferred to the athlete (to prove certain facts and circumstances or the 
lack of intent to commit a violation not involving a particular substance), the 
standard of proof will be ‘balance of probability’.
From the human rights perspective, in order to legitimise the proposal 
in question, we should ask some fundamental questions originally coming 
from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. These 
questions read as follows: is the rule restrictive, and if so, is the restrictiveness 
proportionate to the aim that is being sought? The answer to the first question 
is affirmative: the proposed rule is restrictive, namely, it might interfere with 
the right to reputation (of the tournament organisers and of the players, 
accordingly). The right to reputation is protected by Article 8 of the European 
40 Tennis Anti-Corruption Program (2019) https://www.tennisintegrityunit.com/storage/
app/media/TIU%20Documents/TACP.pdf, pp. 9. Accessed 3 May 2020.
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Convention on Human Rights as part of the right to respect for private 
life.41 The second question concerns proportionality and, in my opinion, the 
answer to it is also affirmative. It is important that there is a rather lenient 
sanction / reaction entrenched: it is stated only that the tournament will be 
not rated. It should be underlined that such a sanction should not directly 
affect a player and thus should not presume the guilt of an athlete. Rather, a 
tournament is ‘punished’. Accordingly, this relatively mild consequence is in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality and the reversed burden of 
proof seems a reasonable way to fight against potential match-fixing. This way 
of creating disciplinary law is also in line with classical principles stemming 
from Cesare Beccaria: the imminence of responsibility is more important 
than severe punishment (Bekarija, 1992). Interestingly, chess organisers from 
India introduced an even more straightforward approach against one form 
of manipulation of chess competitions, namely ‘sandbagging’42: players who 
have already won large cash prizes in previous tournaments are not allowed 
to participate in lower category events.43 The tournament regulations stipulate 
that players who have previously won Rs. 70,000 or more as a cash prize in 
an under-1600 tournament (or any category event which is below 1600) are 
not eligible to participate. Thus, the tournament organisers are not required 
to prove sandbagging (and a player does not even have a chance to prove the 
opposite on the balance on probabilities); instead, they do not allow players to 
take part in the tournament, thus sending a message to sandbaggers that they 
will not have a chance to play.
41 ECHR decision in Axel Springer AG v. Germany, judgment (Grand Chamber) of 
7 February 2012, § 83-84.
42 Sandbagging in the context of chess refers to deliberately playing below one’s actual 
ability in order to lower one’s rating to play in a future event with a higher handicap and 
consequently with a better chance of winning.
43 Shah  S. India’s biggest open in Delhi sets the trend, begins the fight against sandbag-
gers. https://chessbase.in/news/Delhi-Open-2020-fights-against-Sandbagging?fbclid=-
IwAR04RrzwM8A2TIePjpJnnWKX1ayeNvvC-8ai9ZMipyrKffakfUS5fx2Djc4. Accessed 
3 May 2020. By the way, the same rule has been applied in U. S. continental tournaments 
(covering about 50 % or more of all unofficial tournaments) since the 90s.
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Final remarks
Cheating in chess is a multi-faceted issue. On the one hand, computer-
assisted cheating is conceptually very close to technological doping both in 
terms of substantial and procedural issues. However, anti-cheating policy 
within FIDE is very recent, and computer-assisted cheating has never been 
formally recognised as doping by either WADA or FIDE. Doping issues 
and anti-cheating issues within the governance of FIDE fall under different 
regulations and different governing bodies (namely, the Medical Commission 
and the Fair Play Commission), which is why, even though computer-assisted 
cheating is conceptually close to (technological) doping, this insight remains 
in fact a theoretical abstraction.
Moreover, cheating in chess is supposed to include match-fixing issues, 
so that corruption and fraud somehow interplay within the disciplinary 
regulations in chess. There are both advantages and disadvantages in that 
respect. Firstly, while the chess legal system’s ‘underdevelopment’ may appear 
immature, it may also be appropriate, because the chess community feels 
relatively safe and is not yet subject to overarching ‘Orwellian’ surveillance 
mechanisms. There is no duty to report on match-fixing or any other suspicious 
behaviour and there is no right to punish for assumptions of match-fixing. 
However, some modern solutions should be introduced to ensure that the 
anti-cheating policy is not too lax. One solution is to harmonise the statistical 
evidence of Dr. Regan’s system with that already used by CAS in (inter alia) 
Athlete Biological Passport cases by providing him with assistance to make 
his model global. Another suggestion relates to combating match-fixing: it 
would be worthwhile introducing a rule allowing FIDE to reject norms or not 
to rate certain tournaments unless the organisers can satisfy FIDE on the 
balance of probabilities that the tournament was not fixed. Such a rule would 
not require major resources from FIDE and would not put excessive pressure 
on organisers since the potential sanction would be relatively mild. The third 
suggestion would be to ensure the anonymity of whistle-blowers within the 
chess community and thus protect their sporting careers.
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